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An experimental investigation was conducted to examine 
the use of small, expendable, endurance UAVs to enhance the 
combat effectiveness of Naval Special Warfare Forces (NSW).  
The experiment involved UAVs, NSW forces, and a red team in 
a downed-pilot rescue mission.  Models were developed to 
determine optimum flight patterns for all UAVs.  Models 
were also developed and utilized to determine experimental 
variables and measures of effectiveness.  Simulation of the 
exercise was conducted to determine adequacy of the 
experiment plan. 
 
It was found that UAVs significantly enhanced force 
protection, provided direct improvement in C2, 
significantly enhanced situational awareness, and provided 
the ability to track blue forces.  It was found that video 
feed to blue force foot patrols may not be as valuable as 
having the C2 element dedicated to viewing the feed provide 
real-time COMS relay to the patrol.  The exercises 
demonstrated that NSW forces do not need to launch and fly 
UAVs in order to utilize their capabilities; rather UAVs 
can be located and launched at the Forward Operating Base.  
The data obtained imply that small, expendable, endurance 
UAVs may do more than enhance capabilities for current 
missions, they may enable NSW Forces to conduct missions 
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This thesis consists of two separate, yet mutually 
dependent parts.  One part is concerned with the 
organizational network of participants and development of a 
limited objective experiment that can test emerging 
technologies in an operational but analytical environment, 
and be repeated by follow-on students.  The other part is 
concerned with the analysis of the actual integration of a   
small UAV with NSW forces during a specific NSW mission.  
The mission chosen in this case was a downed pilot 
scenario.  The main objective of this second part was to 
show how a small, inexpensive, UAV could impact NSW combat 
effectiveness. 
 While the experiment did not come to full fruition, 
much data was collected, and analysis of that data yielded 
the following observations: 
A well-planned operational experiment can be used as a 
tool for assessment of emerging UAV-technologies, but that 
assessment is limited to only those technologies 
specifically incorporated into the test.  This means it is 
important to field as capable a vehicle as possible at the 
time of the experiment.  Useful feedback, however, can be 
gathered to aid in the development of future technologies 
and to provide a critically evaluated determination as to 
how that technology may best be used to increase NSW combat 
effectiveness. 
The loose network of participants utilized in this 
thesis effort did provide useful input into NAVSOF CONOPS 
  
xiii
and TTPs, and the short-term future sustainability of the 
network looks promising.  The link to operational commands 
will continue to be the most difficult to maintain as their 
primary concern is correctly placed on mission 
accomplishment, not research.     
Finally, and most importantly, the research 
demonstrated that the use of a small, inexpensive UAV 
carrying, in this case, a low-light camera and simulated 
communications relay capability, launched by rear echelon 
personnel, flown by onboard autonomous avionics to 
prescribed and changeable waypoints, and emitting live 
video feeds to both the SEAL platoon in the field as well 
as the C2 element in the rear, proved to have a positive 
impact on the combat effectiveness of NSW forces. 
The technology supporting small tactical UAVs is still 
developing.  Optimal duration, speed, and payload 
capabilities do not currently exist in one aircraft.  
However, these capabilities are being rapidly developed and 
if money and interest were focused in a specific direction 
articulated by NSW, then perhaps this capability could be 
developed that much more rapidly.  This direction provided 
by NSW should be based on a proven need, a need that will 
improve NSW combat effectiveness.  Many engineers that were 
interviewed during the process of this thesis indicated the 
likely capability to rapidly produce the type of vehicle 
described above if a clear direction were given that 
included all necessary minimum requirements.  







It is the purpose of this thesis to provide NSW 
forces, as well as other special operations forces, with 
quantitative Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and 
supporting data that can help guide development and 
operational employment of small UAVs to increase NSW 
combat effectiveness during a variety of NSW missions.  It 
was planned that the data derived from this limited 
objective experiment (LOE) would produce a baseline of 
information which can be used to evaluate the use of small 
UAVs with regards to improved combat effectiveness through 
increased situational awareness, improved command and 
control (C2), and increased and more accurate 
intelligence.  Achievement of these improvements would 
also improve target identification and forces protection.     
As new technologies emerge, they can be tested and 
evaluated in a similar manner to that used in this initial 
limited objective experiment (LOE).  The results can then 
be compared and contrasted to the baseline set of data to 
provide the NSW community, and SOF in general, with the 
information they need to continually evaluate UAV programs 
with regards to improving combat effectiveness as well as 
provide UAV developers with user feedback before and 
during product development so they can meet the specific 
needs of NSW and SOF.   
Additionally, the network team created at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) during the first LOE can 
continue to provide the framework for future enhancement 
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of UAV/NSW integration as new technologies emerge and 
future NSW students perform new LOEs.   
B. BACKGROUND 
There is much research and information in existence 
that documents the general world of UAVs.  A broad 
military use of UAVs has emerged over time with an 
evolving increase in UAV capabilities (UAV Roadmap 2025, 
2001).  The usefulness of UAVs is evident by their 
successful use in the War on Terror in Afghanistan, or as 
seen by the recent Predator missile attack in Yemen on an 
al-Qaeda terrorist, Ali Aqed Sinan al-Harthi, also known 
as Abu Ali, (USA Today, 05NOV02).  However, these high 
profile missions also demonstrate a limitation.  Predator, 
Global Hawk, and other UAVs like them are limited in 
number and expensive, and therefore are considered 
strategic assets.  In fact, according to the Joint Special 
Operations Air Component Commander (JSOACC) during 
operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, COL J. Tyner 
(USAF), it was easier for special operations forces to get 
support from B52s to drop bombs than it was for those same 
forces to get UAV support to “see what was over the next 
hill” (Tyner, 2002).  A study of how SOF should best use 
UAVs determined:  
Control of SOF UAVs should go to those best able 
to utilize them with the general goal to push 
them as far down in the chain of command as 
makes sense.  In other words, commanders should 
seek to empower small units without 
unnecessarily burdening them. (James, p. xiv) 
UAVs are often categorized by the level of war they 
support.  Strategic UAVs are large (the size of single 
pilot single engine aircraft) very expensive, limited in 
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number, and highly capable with advanced optics or sensors 
and even armament; for these reasons they are controlled 
by theater level commanders.  The Predator, a strategic 
UAV, controlled from a submarine, verified intelligence 
and provided tactical information for a SEAL direct action 
training mission on a Silk Worm site in 1997 (Robinson, 
1997, p. 18).  In other words a strategic UAV provided 
tactical intelligence to a tactical unit or commander. 
Tactical UAVs are significantly less expensive, smaller 
than a manned aircraft, and somewhat more abundant.  They 
carry less capable optics and sensors and have less 
endurance, such as the Army’s Hunter or the Navy’s 
Pioneer.  Small or Mini UAVs, such as the Army’s Sentry, 
Nighthawk or Pointer systems, fill a range between 
tactical UAVs and the smallest of all UAVs, the micro-
UAVs.  However, Micro-UAVs are normally considered very 
small, man-portable, fly for about an hour or less and 
carry simple sensor payloads (UAV Roadmap 2025, 2001).  
This thesis focuses on the small UAVs as bridging the gap 
between tactical UAVs, with regards to endurance and 
sensor payloads, and micro-UAVs that are dedicated to the 
single patrol element. It should be noted that 
technologies are rapidly changing which may both reduce 
costs while at the same time greatly improve payload 
capabilities and endurance for the smaller UAVs. 
Tactical UAVs have already proven their usefulness to 
tactical commanders.  “The Army’s Pioneers flew 155 hours 
and 46 sorties providing a quick-fire link that allowed 
the targets they identified to be quickly engaged by other 
systems.  Army Pioneers also helped tactical commanders to 
conduct situation development, targeting, route 
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reconnaissance, and BDA”  (Pioneer UAV Incorporated, 
2000).  The small UAV examined in this thesis is much 
smaller than the Predator or even the Pioneer, but with 
advancements in design and technology, could have some of 
the same capabilities.  While the strategic UAVs are no 
doubt of great value to those that have them at their 
disposal, it is highly unlikely that the majority of NSW 
forces conducting missions will be able to utilize them 
due to their limited number, high cost, and ultimately 
higher prioritized usage.   
This thesis was narrow in scope.  It was not intended 
to be an exhaustive research effort regarding UAV 
capabilities, or a document that identifies the exact UAV 
platform or its minimum requirements for NSW or SOF.  
Instead it attempted to fill in the perceived gap of 
information about small/mini UAVs and their usefulness to 
NSW.  This information is then presented to help NSW 
leaders identify minimum UAV requirements and decide how 
best to improve NSW combat effectiveness to meet the 
operational objectives of the future set forth by the 
Secretary of Defense, articulated in the Navy’s Roadmap to 
Transformation, in the most efficient and effective manner 
possible.  These operational objectives include: 
Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. 
homeland, forces abroad, allies, and friends) 
and defeating CBRNE weapons and their means of 
delivery; 
Assuring information systems in the face of 
attack and conducting effective information 
operations; 
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Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant 
anti-access or area-denial environments and 
defeating anti-access and area denial threats; 
Denying enemies sanctuary by providing 
persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid 
engagement with high-volume precision strike, 
through a combination of complementary air and 
ground capabilities, against critical mobile and 
fixed targets at various ranges and in all 
weather and terrains; 
Enhancing the capability and survivability of 
space systems and supporting infrastructure; and 
leveraging [sic] information technology and 
innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, 
joint C4ISR architecture and capability that 
includes a tailorable joint operational picture 
(Transformation Roadmap, 2002, p. 6). 
While these are national defense objectives, NSW will 
be asked to conduct tactical missions to achieve them.  
Our senior defense leaders wish to “significantly improve 
naval contribution to joint battlespace [sic] awareness” 
and desire to “seamlessly link sensors to warfighters 
[sic]” and visualize that “the deployment of a family of 
Navy and Marine Corps UAVs, equipped with various sensors 
and networked via the Tactical Control System, will play a 
key role in extending the reach, coverage, and persistence 
of the naval ISR systems that provide information to the 
joint force” (Transformation Roadmap, 2002, p.10). It is 
the purpose of this thesis to show how small, inexpensive, 
UAVs may significantly increase the combat effectiveness 
of NSW forces in order to directly accomplish the 
identified U.S. national defense objectives above.  
C. LOE IDENTIFICATION AND PLANNING 
Based upon personal knowledge and experience with 
current SOF missions and operating procedures, it was 
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decided to focus this initial experiment on downed-pilot 
rescue; a mission for which the UAVs have potential for 
significantly improving concepts of operations.  To 
develop interest and participation and to obtain 
recommendations for conducting the LOE a number of 
facilities and commands were visited; Commander Third 
Fleet, Naval Special Warfare Command, Naval Special 
Warfare Development Group, Naval Special Warfare Group 2, 
Office of Force Transformation, Office of Naval Research, 
Center for Naval Analysis, Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Carderock Division, the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL), and the Schafer Corp. in coordination 
with DARPA.  The input received was utilized to initialize 
planning for the equipment and technologies to be employed 
as well as the operational forces to be utilized.  In 
addition, initial efforts were made to establish 
relationships which would support future LOEs conducted at 
NPS.  For example, the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory has agreed to provide some of their latest 
sensors and COMMS for future UAV experiments.  The 
customer for the LOE benefits from being able to 
experiment with the latest technologies, and LLNL has the 
opportunity to test and evaluate their latest technologies 
in an operational environment with well-defined objectives 
and measures of effectiveness. 
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. PARTICIPANTS AND FUNCTIONS 
Primary researcher and experiment observer: LT Butner 
Research advisors: Dr. Netzer, Dean of Research at 
NPS and Dr. DePoy, Director, Wayne E. Meyer Institute of 
Systems Engineering at NPS 
Mathematical model developers: Class Project, Models 
of Conflict (SO4410) students at NPS; LT Butner, Maj 
Aiken, MAJ Barton 
Flight model developers: Class Project, (SI3900), 
Systems Engineering and Integration students at NPS; MAJ 
Poh (SAF), MAJ Tan (SAF) 
Simulation designer: Adaptation and application of 
recently completed thesis in Operations Research from NPS; 
CPT Alistair (AUA) (Alistair, 2002). 
Experiment design assistance: MAJ Phillips (USA), 
TRADOC Analysis Center-Monterey 
Airfield and UAV flight coordinator: Ray Jackson, 
Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely Piloted Air Systems 
(CIRPAS) 
UAV concept leader: Vincent Castelli, Naval Surface 
Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) 
UAV producers: Advanced Ceramics Research (ACR), 
Tucson, AZ 
Blue force participants: CW04(SEAL) Poladian, 
GMC(SEAL) Olson, QM1(SEAL) Cooper, IS1(SEAL) Duff, 
OS1(SEAL) Kolskie, BM1(SEAL) Beck, and MR2(SEAL) Huntimner 
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from Naval Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, FL and 
the Defense Language Institute (DLI) Monterey, CA.   
Red force and downed pilot participants: Ten enlisted 
navy students from DLI. 
Financial support: Center for Defense Technology and 
Education for the Military Services (CDTEMS) at NPS. 
B. GUIDELINES AND TEMPLATE FOR EXPERIMENTS 
1. Guidelines 
One of the intents of this thesis effort was to 
develop general guidelines and a template for a series of 
LOEs to be conducted using unmanned vehicles.  It was 
desired that the template provide the requirements and 
timing for experiment design, modeling and simulation 
support, data collection and analysis, and financial 
support.  Some suggested guidelines are: 
(1) Capitalize on research efforts in other departments or 
institutes that could enhance the effort.  Laboratories 
such as the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) may provide 
useful innovations that can be incorporated into future 
experiments.   
(2) Analytical research methods and modeling should be 
leveraged to identify Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).  
(3) Simulation can verify suitability of experiment design 
and help maximize efficiency.   
(4) Whenever possible, multiple iterations should be run 
in the experiment instead of planning for one iteration, 
plan for an initial iteration, analyze the effectiveness 
of the iteration along with initial results, and then plan 
for a final improved iteration. 
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(5) One should not test untried operational concepts and 
untried technological equipment at the same time.  Verify 
that the equipment being used in the experiment has met 
operational objectives prior to experiment usage.  Time is 
limited at NPS and there is little room for unanticipated 
delays in fielding equipment.   
(6) Establish a military sponsoring command if troops or 
military equipment are required for the experiment.  
Active duty units are very busy, and research is not the 
highest of their priorities.  Locating NSW personnel that 
had the time to participate in an experiment was the most 
difficult aspect of coordinating this experiment; 
coordinating the UAV flights was the second most difficult 
aspect.   
(7) The experiment needs to be kept small and with a 
minimum number of participants so that it can be 
effectively and efficiently completed in the time allotted 
for thesis work.  The U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet is 
designated the Sea Based Battle Lab and is where 
innovative ideas are to be explored to improve war fighter 
effectiveness.  NPS and the Commander Third Fleet (C3F) 
have established a close working relationship.  The Fleet 
Force Command (FFC) has recently been assigned 
responsibility for coordinating and conducting Fleet 
experiments in the Seal Trial process, and the three NPS 
Institutes are establishing close ties with this command. 
However, most of these experiments are large and may limit 
the freedom and flexibility normally allowed the student 
at NPS.  The Office of Force Transformation may also 
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provide assistance, ideas, funding, and other helpful 
contacts. 
(8) Finally, ensure MOEs are developed early and that 
those MOEs drive the experiment design and analysis.  The 
Dean of Research at NPS and the Wayne E. Meyer Institute 
of Systems Engineering are excellent places to present the 
research idea and tap into the ongoing research at NPS and 
elsewhere in that field.  These are also excellent places 
to locate a potential thesis advisor with expertise in the 
field of interest. 
2. Template 
A general template follows with a brief description 
of how the template was utilized in the initial LOE. 
(1) Determine/establish the war fighter requirement.  This 
was based upon SECDEF and CNO transformation guidelines 
(DON, 2002), personal discussions with various commands 
(see II.A), and personal experience with NSW/SOF 
operations) 
(2) Understand the current capabilities and shortfalls for 
meeting the requirements, both in technologies and 
concepts of operation.  These were based upon personal 
knowledge and discussions with others in the NSW/SOF 
community.  UAV and payload technologies for the desired 
expendable UAV characteristics were discussed with the 
NSWCCD, SWARM Program manager, and the UAV literature 
reviewed, for example: DOD’s UAV Roadmap 2025 (2001). 
(3) Identify the technologies to be utilized, their 
maturity and availability, and the level of difficulty for 
their utilization.  Ensure new operational concepts are 
not to be introduced using unproven technological 
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capabilities.  These were based upon the SWARM Program 
Plan for time-lines and actual capability demonstrations 
before the experiment was to be conducted. 
(4) Identify the personnel requirements for conducting the 
experiment.  These were based on standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), tactics techniques and procedures 
(TTPs), and logistics involved in execution. 
(5) Identify and secure adequate financial resources 
before proceeding with more detailed planning.  Funding 
was arranged through the NPS Center for Defense 
Technologies and Education for the Military Services 
(CDTEMS). 
(6) Lay out the initial experiment design, including the 
timing for personnel and equipment (described below). 
(7) Ensure availability for personnel, equipment, and 
facilities for the planned dates of the experiment.  This 
was achieved through multiple early meetings and requests.  
When shortfalls were identified, they could be immediately 
addressed.  Forces utilized were obtained from multiple 
sources.  The red force and downed pilots came from the 
Defense Language Institute Monterey, CA and the blue force 
SEALs came from Naval Coastal Systems Station, Panama 
City, FL. 
(8) Review the experiment design with operational 
commands, (FFC, Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NAVSPECWARCOM), Naval Special Warfare Development Group 
(NAVSPECWARDEVGRU)), and a broad cross section of faculty 
at NPS (systems engineering, Modeling and Simulation 
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(M&S), technology experts, etc.) (See Participants and 
Functions, II A.) 
(9) Determine what M&S will be required to adequately plan 
and conduct the experiment.  Identity a range of 
experimental variables, fixed parameters, etc., and 
provide a model which can be (partially or fully) 
validated with the experimental data to be obtained.  (See 
VII. Modeling and Simulation.) 
(10) Use M&S to refine the experiment design. (Discussed 
below.) 
(11) Develop a data collection plan and how the data will 
be utilized to determine quantitative and qualitative 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  This will include 
personnel and personnel skills requirements. (Discussed 
below.) 
(12) Develop an orientation/initial training plan to be 
conducted for all personnel involved in the experiment.  
This will include pre-experiment, experiment, and post-
experiment activities. (See III E. Training/Orientation) 
(13)Conduct the experiment and collect the data. 
(Discussed below.) 
(14) Analyze the data and develop the MOEs and lessons 
learned. (Discussed below.) 




III. LIMITED OBJECTIVE EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
A. SCENARIO DESIGN 
While SEAL patrols normally consist of a minimum of 
eight personnel, depending on the mission, two were 
considered to be adequate for purposes of this experiment.  
The additional SEALs in a patrol provide extra fire power 
and mission essential skills, but the standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for two SEALs on patrol are basically 
the same as for eight.  The footprint, or signature of 
their presence is reduced, but this should have minimal 
effects on the data to be analyzed.  Additionally, a 
limited number of red force and blue force personnel were 
available.  The use of two blue force personnel per search 
element meant that the red force element, made up of four 
personnel, would be double the size of the blue force.  A 
red force double the size of the blue force was used in 
all M&S. 
The experiment was designed to consist of a total of 
ten Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions conducted at 
Camp Roberts, CA.  The participants consisted of seven NSW 
SEALs.  These SEALs filled two search teams, each with two 
SEALs per team.  The remaining SEALs were part of the 
Command and Control (C2) element, one C2 element with one 
SEAL and one C2 element with two SEALs.  The eight red 
cell personnel (two teams of four), two downed pilots (one 
per operational area), and multiple observers and support 
personnel made up the remainder of the participants.  A 
two by four kilometer op area was chosen to allow for the 
maximum amount of data points to be collected while still 
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being able to conduct the mission within a single cycle of 
darkness.  Five of these op areas were then chosen for 
their varying terrain and to ensure that participants were 
not operating in familiar territory.  Personnel locations 
were to be changed in each op area to prevent any bias 
from a previous night’s mission.  Each op area was to host 
two separate teams conducting the same mission on 
different nights.  However, one team would be assisted by 
two tactical UAVs and one team would not.  The op areas 
were to be used in a random order and the NSW search teams 
would not know what op area they would be inserted into 
until the night of the operation, nor would they know if 
they were to be assisted by UAVs until that night.  This 
was to ensure teams could not help one another plan for 
that night’s mission.  The scenario within one particular 
op area was exactly the same for each team except for the 
UAVs.  All participants in a given op area were inserted 
in the exact same location as the other group that had 
utilized that op area the night before.  The insertion 
locations of the participants relative to each other 
varied with each op area. 
Nightly missions were to continue for a total of five 
nights, until both teams conducted all the same scenarios 
one time.  This, however, was not accomplished, and only 
two separate nights of missions were conducted.  The 
reason for this change will be described in more detail 
below.  Each mission scenario varied only by location of 
crash sight, pilot, red cell, NSW team insertion point, 
and the geographical and terrain differences among the op 
areas.  Distances between forces were nearly identical.  
This would allow for direct comparison of missions 
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conducted in the same op area and a general comparison of 
missions conducted in other op areas.  The initial general 
scheme of force locations can be seen in Figure 1.  During 
early experiment design and before a sight survey had been 
conducted, force locations were plotted in representative 
op areas and arrows were used to indicate the direction of 
travel to safety for the pilot.   
Op Area 1         Op Area 2       Op area 3 






















Op Area 4         Op Area 5 













Figure 1.   Initial Force Orientation 
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B. FORCE LOCATION  
Two NSW teams, consisting of a two-SEAL patrol 
element and a C2 element, were to conduct two separate 
CSAR missions in two successive nights.  Each night’s 
mission was to be conducted in a different four by two 







Crash sight and 






OP area 5 
OP area 4 
OP area 3 
OP area 2 
OP area 1 
Figure 2.   Force Location Overlay   
 
In the figure above, and as indicated in the key, red 
force insertion points are represented by red Hexagons.  
The blue force insertion points are represented by blue 
arrows.  The pilot’s location is represented by the green 
star within a black circle.  This circle represents an 
800M diameter area in which the pilot should be located 
with reference to his last known location.  During the 
mission, the pilot could communicate with the blue search 
element when they came within range of his survival radio 
(simulated PRC 112).  The pilot could then relay his 
position to the search element using a pre-established 
point, or an evade and recovery point (E&R), by giving his 
range and bearing from that E&R point.  The NSW forces (C2 
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and search elements) were provided with intelligence 
usually available to a SOF team assigned a CSAR mission in 
an area controlled by the enemy; crash sight coordinates, 
last known position of pilot, positive radio 
communication/authentication, and most likely direction of 
travel(Joint Pub 3-50.2, p. II-6).  Therefore the C2 
element and the blue search element knew the crash site 
location, represented by the red explosion symbol, and the 
direction of the pilot’s travel, represented by the black 
arrow.  The blue forces also knew that the pilot intended 
to remain within 800M of his last known location for the 
first 4 hours after the mission began.  If contact was not 
made within 4 hours, all blue forces were aware that the 
pilot would begin to move in the direction towards 
friendly territory, which was the same direction of 
initial movement.  The C2 element, located at McMillan 
Assault Strip and represented by the blue C2 in Figure 2, 
remained at the assault strip for all missions and was 
collocated with the UAV pilot in the ground control 








Figure 3.   Ground Control Station   
 
The red cell consisted of a four-man patrol of 
infantry personnel with little training, utilized to 
simulate a poorly trained conscript force.  They patrolled 
a one by two kilometer area that contained the downed 
pilot’s most likely position based on indicators suggested 
after initial simulation runs.   
The downed pilot simulated evasion through a safe 
corridor by moving on a given bearing (after 4 hours) or 
by holding up near his last relayed position (800M 
diameter).  This position was the position given to the 
search element as the pilot’s last known point.  As the 
search element came within line of sight (LOS) 
communications range, they would attempt to establish 
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communications with the pilot at which time he would 
update his position by giving a bearing and distance from 
a known point (the E&R point).  All participants remained 
within the designated two by four kilometer area. 
One of the NSW forces was to have been provided the 
additional asset of one or two small tactical UAVs.  This 
force was to conduct its mission in the same manner as the 
non-UAV force except for the deviations that are driven by 
the use of the UAVs.  The mission areas were to be exactly 
the same, as well as the locations of the red cell and 
downed pilot insertion points.  The insertion point was 
also the same for both NSW forces, but the infiltration 
routes could differ based on information provided by UAVs.  
If two UAVs were available then one would be designated 
the pilot UAV and the other designated the patrol UAV.  
The pilot UAV would fly a flight pattern determined by a 
classical search theory for non-moving targets near a 
known point, taking into account the field of view of the 
video camera, the UAV altitude, and the UAV turning radius 
(Figure 4).  The pattern in Figure 4 assumes that the UAV 
is at an altitude of 400ft.  The field of view at this 
altitude is 90m so the horizontal paths across the search 
area are separated by 90m.  The UAV starts at the bottom 
of the circle, moves right to left, makes the 180 degree 
turn determined by its turning radius, and then returns 
along a second path from left to right which is parallel 
to the first but offset by 90m.  This would continue until 
the pilot is located, and the situational awareness (SA) 









Figure 4.   Downed Pilot Search Pattern 
 
Once the downed pilot was located, the pilot UAV 
would then fly a situational awareness (SA) route to 
provide the C2 element with a one-kilometer radius SA zone 
about the downed pilot (Figure 5).  This flight pattern 
would be repeated until the end of the mission and 
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Figure 5.   Pilot SA Zone  
 
The patrol UAV would fly a flight pattern designed to 
maximize situational awareness of the patrol and the C2 
element for a one-kilometer diameter perimeter about the 
patrol during their infiltration (Figure 6).  This was 
again based upon the camera field of view, UAV altitude, 
and UAV speed.  
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 Figure 6.   Patrol Flight Pattern 
 
The blue cross in Figure 6 represents the SEAL search 
element as they begin to patrol moving in a straight line 
from left to right.  The patrol UAV starts in the upper 
left-hand corner and follows the red flight path from left 
to right.  Once the UAV reaches the end of the first red 
line the turn is initiated, indicated by the same dog-bone 
shapes seen in the pilot SA pattern.  These turn angles 
are again dictated by the turning radius and speed of the 
UAV and are designed to return the UAV to the next 
parallel flight path, offset by 90m, as quickly as 
possible.  The UAV then travels along the second red line 
from right to left.  Once the end is reached the same dog-
bone turn is made however, the remaining turns are deleted 
for clarity.  Notice here that the UAV did not travel as 
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far down this second red line.  This is because the blue 
force has moved from their initial starting point.  Once 
all the red paths have been traveled the UAV ends up in 
the bottom right-hand corner and makes a turn onto the 
green diagonal line to return to a new starting point.  
The UAV begins the same pattern now indicated by the green 
lines.  Notice the green pattern begins approximately 
1.5km past the red pattern in the direction of blue force 
travel.  This movement of the UAV’s start point also takes 
into account the movement of the blue force.  At the end 
of the green pattern when the UAV turns onto the purple 
path, the blue force has moved to the point indicated by 
the grey cross.  At this point the red flight pattern can 
begin again.  The red pattern can also be initiated if 
there is a long pause in the movement of the blue forces.  
The C2 element has the capability to redirect any of the 
UAVs in mid-flight. 
Experiment observers were to track actual movements 
conducted by all participants to verify actual C2 and 
ground force situational awareness.  A number of different 
recording methods could also be employed to help track 
movements and gather data, such as UAV over-flight 
recording tactical UAV movement, voice recording, manual 
note taking, and GPS waypoint tracking. 
The force location diagram (Figure 1) was overlaid 
onto a map of the operational areas to be used during the 
experiment (Figure 2).  This was done to add focus and 
purpose to a sight survey.  The op areas were then chosen, 
after the sight survey, for their varied vegetation and 
terrain features.  All operational areas also had to 
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remain within the restricted airspace available for UAV 
flights.  The final force locations and operational areas 
can be seen in Figure 2 as they were to be utilized during 
the LOE. 
While most of the operational areas in Figure 2 were 
utilized, the UAVs were unable to fly outside of visual 
range from McMillan Assault Strip due to a lack of 
adequate liability insurance for autonomous flight (a 
lesson learned regarding detailed planning requirements).  
This, of course, negatively impacted the design of the 
experiment.  In addition, severe weather resulted in 
cancellation of the last two nights of operation.  To make 
accommodations for these unforeseen effects, only two non-
UAV missions were run.  In addition, limited line of sight 
flights were conducted to test equipment and the user 
interface, and secondary autonomous flights were scheduled 
(and conducted) for 04DEC02-06DEC02 in a new location 
(Tucson, AZ).  While a direct correlation between the 
missions with the UAV and those without could no longer be 
made, enough data was gathered to make strong inferences 
of effects on the identified MOEs.  
C. DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
1. Experiment Instructions to Participants and 
Qualitative Questionnaires 
The following experiment instructions and 
questionnaires were given to each group before and 
following each night’s mission.  The instructions ensured 
that quantitative data could be collected properly, 
emphasizing GPS waypoints as a function of time during the 
experiments.  The questionnaire portion was developed to 
obtain further insight into the four MOEs that could not 
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be obtained through quantitative data alone, as well as to  
obtain specific information about the technical 
application of some of the equipment by the participants.  
The cumulative responses are provided in the data section 
of this thesis. 
Blue Force Without UAV; Experiment Requirements and 
Questionnaire 
Requirements: 
Blue search element must carry GPS at all times.  
Position must be marked as waypoint on GPS every 10 
minutes (GPS has one button function for this operation).  
Blue search element must notate all red force 
sightings/engagements/contacts with time and GPS 
coordinate.  This may be done after the fact if compromise 
is possible.  All pilot contact must be noted with time 
and GPS coordinate.  All communications with pilot must be 
noted with time and brief one or two word description.  If 
pilot position is known or estimated to be known, this 
should be annotated with time and approximate location.  
If pilot position is thought to have changed, this should 
be noted with time and approximate new position.  Observer 
may be utilized to maintain event log and GPS waypoints if 
available.  Locating the pilot without compromise (counter 
detection by red force) is the blue force mission. 
The following questions are to be answered upon 




(1) Qualitative responses to situational 
awareness/target identification questions. 
1.  How did you estimate the pilot position? 
2.  Did you know your position with confidence in 
relation to the pilot?   
3.  Upon detection of enemy, if any, how confident 
were you that this was an enemy force?  Why?.    
4.  Upon detection of pilot, if any, how confident 
were you that this was the pilot, from what distance did 
you make this determination?    
5.  What actions did you take at this time, why? 
6.  If enemy contact was made, what actions did you 
take, why? 
(2) Qualitative questions for force protection. 
1.  What actions did you take, if any, when provided 
enemy position?  
2.  How confident were you in the info passed to you, 
if any, by the C2 element? 




Blue C2 element must track blue search force, red 
force (if possible), and pilot.  Positions of all three 
forces must be marked as coordinates on a map every 10 
minutes.  If no change of position is noted, then this 
must be annotated in log every 10 minutes.  Blue C2 
element will act as on-scene commander for blue search 
element, conduct limited tactical operation center (TOC) 
functions, receive radio broadcast updates, and provide 
intelligence updates to forces in the field at the 
discretion of the TOC commander.  Senior commander to C2 
element (commander not on scene) will require updates of 
noteworthy activity hourly.  This will include major event 
times and locations (infiltration, link up, mission 
complete, enemy activity).  C2 element will maintain radio 
and video watch during field operations.  C2 element will 
maintain operations log with short entries every 10 
minutes (force locations/time/major events).  Extra 
support personnel/observers, if available, may be utilized 
for making log entries and updating maps. Locating the 
pilot without compromise is the blue force mission. 
The following questions are to be answered by C2 
element upon return of blue search element from each 
mission. 
Questionnaire: 
(1) Qualitative responses to situational awareness 
1.  Did you know force positions with confidence 
(level 1-10) in relation to each other?   
2.  How confident were you in the info passed to you 
by the blue force? 
3.  How did you determine your force’s position, what 
techniques did you use? 
4.  How did you determine pilot position? 
5.  How did you determine enemy position? 
(2) Qualitative questions for force protection 
1.  Did you know the enemy position in relation to 
your force’s position with confidence (level 1 (low)- 10 
(high))?      
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Blue Force With UAV; Experiment Requirements and 
Questionnaire 
Requirements: 
Blue search element must carry GPS at all times.  
Position must be marked as waypoint on GPS every 10 
minutes (GPS has one button function for this operation).  
Blue search element must notate all red force 
sightings/engagements/contacts with time and GPS 
coordinate.  This may be done after the fact if compromise 
is possible.  All pilot contact must be noted with time 
and GPS coordinate.  All communications with pilot must be 
noted with time and brief one or two word description.  If 
pilot position is known or estimated to be known, this 
should be annotated with time and approximate location.  
If pilot position is thought to have changed, this should 
be noted with time and approximate new position.  Observer 
may be utilized to maintain event log and GPS waypoints if 
available.  Locating the pilot without compromise (counter 
detection by red force) is the blue force mission. 
The following questions are to be answered upon 
return from each mission and after return of GPS to 
experiment personnel. 
Questionnaire: 
(1) Qualitative responses to situational awareness 
1.  Did you see the pilot on the video screen? 
2.  If so did this help you link up? 
3.  What actions did you take upon seeing the pilot 
on screen? 
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4.  Did you see yourself on the video screen? 
5.  Did you know your position with confidence in 
relation to the pilot?  Was this due to the ability to see 
the pilot or via GPS only? 
6.  Did you see terrain features or any other objects 
on the video screen, describe briefly, did this help 
operations in any way? 
7.  How confident were you in the info passed to you, 
if any, by the C2 element? 
(2) Qualitative questions for force protection 
1.  Did you see enemy personnel or any other 
personnel on video screen? 
2.  Did you know the enemy position with confidence 
in relation to your position?        
3.  Was this confidence due to the ability to see 
enemy personnel/or provided by C2?  
4.  What actions did you take, if any, when provided 
enemy position?  
5.  Did you hear or observe the UAV? 
6.  Did the UAV make you feel vulnerable or secure, 
or neither? 
7.  Did UAV provide you with a 1KM “observed zone” 
about your position? 
8.  How would you better employ the UAV to improve 
your mission? 
(3) Qualitative questions for target identification 
  29
1.  Upon detection of enemy, if any, how confident 
were you that this was an enemy force?  Why? 
2.  Upon detection of pilot, if any, how confident 
were you that this was the pilot, from what distance did 
you make this determination?    
3.  What actions did you take at this time/why? 
(4) Technique of employment and hardware quality 
1.  How often did you view the video screen? 
2.  How did you maintain light discipline with 
screen/why? 
3.  How did you carry the screen? 
4.  How did you carry all other equipment? 
5.  Did any UAV related equipment hamper any normal 
field operations/how? 
6.  Was there a delay in response to your requests 
for aircraft movement/how much/how did this effect your 
operations? 
7.  Would direct control of aircraft benefit your 
operations/how/why? 
Blue C2 Element With UAV; Experiment Requirements and 
Questionnaire 
Requirements: 
Blue C2 element must track blue search force, red 
force (if possible), and pilot.  Positions of all three 
forces must be marked as coordinates on a map every 10 
minutes.  If no change of position is noted, then this 
must be annotated in log every 10 minutes.  Blue C2 
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element will act as on scene commander for blue search 
element, conduct limited TOC functions, receive radio 
broadcast updates, and provide intelligence updates to 
forces in the field at the discretion of the TOC 
commander.  Senior commander to C2 element (commander not 
on scene) will require updates of noteworthy activity 
hourly.  This will include major event times and locations 
(infiltration, link up, mission complete, enemy activity).  
C2 element will maintain radio and video watch during 
field operations.  C2 element will maintain operations log 
with short entries every 10 minutes (force 
locations/time/major events).  Extra support 
personnel/observers, if available, may be utilized for 
making log entries and updating maps. Locating the pilot 
without compromise is the blue force mission. 
Questionnaire: 
The following questions are to be answered by C2 
element upon return of blue search element from each 
mission. 
(1) Qualitative responses to situational awareness 
1.  Did you see the pilot on the video screen? 
2.  If so, did this help you in your mission/how? 
3.  What actions did you take upon seeing the pilot 
on screen? 
4.  Did you see the blue search force on the video 
screen? 
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5.  Did you know force positions with confidence in 
relation to each other?  Was this due to the ability to 
see the pilot or via voice comms only? 
6.   Did you see terrain features or any other 
objects on the video screen, describe briefly, did this 
help operations in any way/how? 
7.  How confident were you in the info passed to you, 
if any, by the blue force? 
(2) Qualitative questions for force protection 
1.  Did you see enemy personnel or any other 
personnel on video screen? 
2.  Did you know the enemy position with confidence 
in relation to your forces position?        
3.  Was this confidence, if any, due to the ability 
to see enemy personnel/or provided by the UAV in any way?  
4.  What actions did you take, if any, when provided 
enemy position?  
5.  Did the UAV provide you with a 1KM “observed 
zone” about the position of your search element? 
6.  Were you confident there were no enemy personnel 
in this zone, explain? 
7.  How would you better employ the UAV to improve 
your mission? 
(3) Qualitative questions for target identification 
1.  How confident were you that you could identify 
different forces via video? 
2.  Did known UAV location help identify forces? 
3.  How could forces be identified better, if at all? 
(4) Technique of employment and hardware quality 
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1.  How often did you view the video screen? 
2.  How long could one person view the video without 
need of a break? 
3.  Did any UAV related equipment hamper any normal 
C2 operations/how? 
4.  Did any UAV related equipment enhance normal C2 
operations/how? 
5.  Would direct control of the aircraft benefit your 
operations/how/why? 
6.  How did you communicate with UAV pilot and were 
there any delays in your requests? 
Red Force; Experiment Requirements and Questionnaire 
Requirements: 
Red force must carry GPS at all times.  Position must 
be marked as waypoint on GPS every 10 minutes (GPS has one 
button function for this operation).  Red force must 
notate all blue force, UAV, pilot 
sightings/engagements/contacts with time and GPS 
coordinate.  This may be done after the fact if engaged in 
a contact.  Red force may engage any targets thought to be 
hostile.  Capturing blue pilot is the red force mission. 
 
Questionnaire: 
The following questions are to be answered upon 
return from each mission and after return of GPS to 
experiment personnel. 
(1) Qualitative questions for force protection 
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1.  Did you see blue force personnel or any other 
personnel? 
2.  If so, what gave away their position or how did 
you locate them? 
3.  Did you hear or see the UAV?  
4.  If so what actions did you take, if any?  
5.  Did this help you locate the pilot or any other 
personnel? 
Downed Pilot; Experiment Requirements and 
Questionnaire 
Requirements: 
Downed pilot must carry GPS at all times.  Position 
must be marked as waypoint on GPS every 10 minutes (GPS 
has one button function for this operation).  Pilot must 
notate all red cell sightings/engagements/contacts with 
time and GPS coordinate.  This may be done after the fact 
if compromise is possible.  All blue force contact must be 
noted with time and GPS coordinate.  All communications 
with blue force or C2 must be noted with time and brief 
one or two word description.  If blue force position is 
known or estimated to be known, this should be annotated 
with time and approximate location.  If blue force 
position is thought to have changed, this should be noted 
with time and approximate new position.  Pilot mission is 
to be located and recovered by blue force without being 
compromised/captured by red force.  
Questionnaire: 
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The following questions are to be answered upon 
return from each mission and after return of GPS to 
experiment personnel. 
(1) Qualitative responses to situational awareness 
1.  Were you told of your position in relationship to 
any other forces? 
2.  If so, did this help you link up with those 
forces? 
3.  What actions did you take upon being given this 
info, if any? 
4.  Did you have confidence in the location of 
yourself or others/why?     
5.  How confident were you in the info passed to you, 
if any, by the C2 element or blue force? 
(2) Qualitative questions for force protection 
1.  Did you know the enemy position with confidence 
in relation to your position?        
2.  Was this confidence, if any, due to information 
provided by C2?  
3.  What actions did you take, if any, when provided 
enemy position?  
4.  Did you hear or observe the UAV? 
5.  Did the UAV make you feel vulnerable or secure, 
or neither? 
6.  Did the UAV help with your recovery or hamper, or 
neither? 
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7.  How could the UAV have been better utilized to 




Amount of time to reach downed pilot  
 Likelihood of finding/detecting the pilot  
 Likelihood of detecting the red force 
 Likelihood of the search element being detected 
 Situational awareness 
Independent variables: 
 Terrain 




Speed (basically constant rate of movement for 
small troops) 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The following general MOEs were the enabling 
objectives chosen for their impact on Combat 
effectiveness: 
- Situational awareness 
- Command and Control 
- Target identification 
- Force protection 
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 The following specific MOEs were the measurable 
quantities that could lead to a judgment about the more 
general MOEs and combat effectiveness as a whole. 
- Distance between blue forces and pilot 
- Distance between red forces and all blue forces 
- Number of blue force detections of red forces  
- Number of red force detections of blue forces 
- Time to link up between pilot and blue force 
- Number of successful mission (link up without   
  compromise) 
- Command and Control (C2) red force location estimation 
- C2 blue force location estimation 
- C2 downed pilot location estimation 
- Qualitative responses to usability of UAV equipment in  
  the field 
 
F. TRAINING/ORIENTATION  
Two days were set aside to train all forces on the 
operational equipment and procedures as well as the data 
collection equipment and procedures.  Each day consisted 
of six hours of instruction or hands-on practical 
training. 
The operational equipment consisted of the following: 
- UAVs, which the forces did not have to operate 
themselves, but were given a basic introduction 
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- Video receiver equipment, which was basic in operation 
and only needed to be prepped for field use or TOC use 
- Tactical field radios, which the SEALs brought with them 
and already knew how to use.   
This training and introduction took one to two hours 
and required about one hour of prep time for the forces.  
If NSW forces themselves are not required to directly 
operate the UAVs, their ability to incorporate them into 
NSW missions will require minimal amounts of training in 
the future.    
The operational procedures training began with the 
overall exercise brief, a separate forces scenario brief, 
and a planning session for the forces, at which time 
questions could be answered about specific operational 
questions. 
The second day consisted of six hours of introduction 
and training with the data collection procedures and 
equipment.  The overall data collection goals were 
identified during the initial brief and the primacy of 
data collection over mission accomplishment was 
emphasized.   
The data collection equipment consisted of the 
following: 
- Data questionnaires (see III B) 
- Infrared (IR) strobes; small firefly type, mounted to a  
  9-volt battery 
- IR chemlights; IR chemical light sticks, simply “break  
  and shake”  
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- Tape recorders; mini cassette type used to note events  
  instead of paper 
- GPS receivers; Garmen Vistas with local topo maps loaded 
All data questionnaires were reviewed, and questions 
were answered.  IR strobes, IR chemlights, tape recorders, 
and batteries were all disseminated, and proper function 
was ensured.  A one-hour GPS receiver class was given that 
included specific necessary functions required during the 
LOE, followed by two hours of practical training with 
operating manuals available.   All personnel were 
competent with the use of all data collection equipment 
and procedures by the end of the training period. 
No deficiencies were noted in operational procedures 
or data collection due to lack of understanding or 
improper use of any equipment.  The primacy of the 
collection of data, as opposed to mission accomplishment, 
allowed forces to concentrate on this aspect.  The result 
of their efforts was a steady stream of uncorrupted data 
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IV. UAV PLATFORM AND PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION 
The original desired UAV characteristics were low-
cost/expendable, organic, stealth, long endurance (>4 
hours for experiment, >12 hrs for future use), night 
vision, precision location, no required SOF control 
(autonomous or C2 personnel control, but optional SOF 
control), and launch with no recovery.  When the 
experiment was initially planned, the SWARM UAV being 
developed by NSWCCD was selected because it met all of the 
desired characteristics and because the development 
program plan would be capable of providing tested vehicles 
at the scheduled time for the LOE.  This turned out not to 
be the case.  Neither the endurance, level of night 
vision, nor the image resolution at flight speed met 
development objectives on time.  This resulted in having 
to change the experiment plan and was a “lesson learned”; 
do not plan experiments for which all equipment/ 
technologies have not been demonstrated. 
A. SWARM UAV GOAL CAPABILITIES 
1. Program Goal; Platform Characteristics 
Name: Smart Warfighting Array of 
Reconfigurable Modules 
(SWARM) (Figure 7, front 
row) 
Developers: Naval Surface Warfare 
Center, Carderock Division 
(NSWCCD) and Advanced 
Ceramics Research 
Dimensions:  4’ length x 3.5’ wingspan 
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Launch weight:  20 lbs. 
Propulsion: (fuel, engine, generator, 
mechanicals) 11.5 lbs. 
Weight:  (Airframe, avionics, and 
communications) 4.5 lbs. 
Payload: 4 lbs. 
Engine: OS.40, compression ignition, 
burns JP-5/8 fuel 
Airframe:  Molded plastic, five-piece 
snap-fit assembly, no tools 
required, stowed in 50” x 7” 
x 17” box, ready to assemble 
Speed:  60 kts cruise speed 
Duration:  24 hrs. duration (FY02) 
Range: 1500 n.mi.  
Ceiling: 8,000 ft. 
2. Program Goal; Payload Characteristics 
EO/IR camera 
CHEM/BIO sensors 
Auto target sensor 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)      
B. UAV CHARACTERISTICS AT TIME OF LOE (ALTERNATE) 
1. Alternate UAV Platform Characteristics 
Due to the restricted flight time capability of the 
SWARM and the status of payload integration, an alternate 
vehicle (Figure 7, back row) was used in most of the 
experiments. 
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 Figure 7.   Alternate UAV Back Row/SWARM UAV Front 
Row  
 
Name: Extra Easy 
Producer: Hangar 9 
Weight: 15 lbs 
Wingspan:  65 inches 
Length:  50 inches 
Fuel capacity:   2 liters 
Duration:   45 minutes – two hours 
Engine:   Modified OS Max.46 producing 
approximately 1 Hp 
Max Bank angle:  limited to +-15 degrees 
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Turn Radius:   minimum turn radius under 
autopilot control is 
approximately 250 meters 
Frequencies: 902.6-927.4 MHz 
Tuning Step in MHz: 400kHz,  
Occupied bandwidth: per channel is 350kHz 
Emission Bandwidth: 350kHz per channel 
Transmit power Watts: 1.0 W 
Transmitter:  MHX 910, Microhard Systems 
Launch Method: Traditional rolling take-off 
used for autonomous flights. 
However, test catapult 
launch was successful with 
SWARM (Figure 8)  
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 Figure 8.   SWARM Catapult Launch  
 
2. Transmitter Characteristics  
Ground-station to aircraft and aircraft to ground-
station, Command and Control link, 10nm range (not fully 
tested) 
Antenna nomenclature: Whip 
Antenna Type:  5/8 wave 
Antenna Gain:  3.5 dbi 
Antenna Polarization:  Vertical 
Antenna feed point: height 3 meters 
Receiver Nomenclature: MHX 910, Microhard Systems 
Receiver Sensitivity: 105 dB 
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Receiver frequency band: 902-930 MHz 
Receiver antenna Type: 1/4 wave whip 
Receiver antenna Gain: 10 dbi 
3. Avionics:  
Built by Cloud Cap 
Technology (541)387-2030.  
Screen shots taken of 
avionics software during the 











Figure 10.   UAV Pilot Command Page  
 
4. Payload Characteristics 
Camera:     
Type:  1/2" B&W 0.0003 Lux CCD  
Wattage/Voltage:  2.2 W, 12 VDC, 180 mA 
Resolution:   570 TV Lines 
Manufacturer:   Watec (Model: LCL-802H) 
Web site:    www.watec.com/bwboard.html 
Weight:    70 g   
Dimensions:   42 mm x 42 mm x 20 mm    
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Camera battery:  
Capacity:    12 VDC, 2100 mA/H 
Weight:    375 g 
Lens: 12 mm (a spherical) Lens w/ 
Auto Iris 
Wattage/Voltage:  0.4 W, 12 VDC, 35 mA 
Look angle: 38.6 degrees diagonal 
 31.2 degrees horizontal 
 23.6 degrees vertical 
Resolution: Image Format 6.4 mm x 4.8 mm 
Manufacturer: COMPUTAR (Model: HG1208AFCS-
HSP) 
Weight: 146 g, (mounting platform w/ 
focus control adds 65 g) 
Dimensions: 42 mm x 57 mm x 55 mm 
Transmitter:  2.4 Ghz 1 Watt Wireless 
Video Transmitter 
Batteries: 
Capacity: 12 VDC, 2100 mA/H 
Weight: 375 g 
5. Other Equipment Characteristics  
IR strobe: Firefly, mounts to 9 volt 
battery, 2x3cm in size, 
mounted to personnel 
clothing with duct tape 
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IR chemlight: Chemical light stick, IR 
spectrum, 4” long, 1/2” 
diameter 
The use of the available camera described above 
required IR strobes to be placed on all forces.  In other 
words, the camera could not detect humans on the ground in 
complete darkness, but it could detect these small strobes 
from an altitude of at least 4000ft AGL.  The IR 
chemlights could not be detected above 800ft AGL and 
therefore were not used.  The camera used did provide some 
daylight capability in black and white, but bright objects 
during the day could cause some “white out” effect.  The 
camera was chosen for its low cost and size.  There exist 
considerably more advanced cameras that have the same 
dimensions; however, price and time precluded their use in 
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V. DATA 
A. DATA WITHOUT UAV 
1. Quantitative Data Measuring Situational 
Awareness, Command and Control, Force 
Protection, and Target Identification 
04NOV02 Mission #1, alpha forces. 
 - Number of blue force detections of red forces: One 
 claimed but false; red force was 2500 meters away at 
 time.  
- Time to link up between pilot and blue force: 
 4h:2min. 
- Positive link up: Yes.  
- Number of counter detections by red force of blue 
 force or pilot: None. 
Figure 11 represents the actual locations of the 
forces (obtained from GPS waypoints every ten minutes) and 
their proximity to each other as they moved within the op 
area without the help of a UAV.  These locations were to 
have been compared to a second group of forces utilizing a 
UAV.  The closest proximity of red forces and blue forces 
or blue forces and the downed pilot could then be compared 
for missions with and without the use of UAVs.  By itself 
this figure is a graphical representation of the courses 
the forces took during the scenario.   
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Figure 11.   Alpha Forces 04NOV02 
 
Table 1 provides the situational awareness (SA) 
difference between a force’s actual location and the C2 
element’s estimate.  The two columns beneath “GPS track” 
contain the actual GPS location of the Blue force during 
mission number one in six digit grid coordinates.  For 
example, Wave Point (WP) 1 UTM grid location is 014557, WP 
3 UTM grid location is 009547.  There are many data points 
for a single force as the force was on the move, and the 
points started at the beginning of the mission and ended 
when the pilot was located.  The red force and downed 
pilot positions are given in separate tables.  The next 
two columns under “C2 estimate” contain the C2 element’s 
best guess as to where the blue force was.  When the 
location matches exactly, this usually indicates a point 
when the blue force called back to the C2 element with a 
position update, which occurred only once an hour.  The 
“difference” columns present the difference in hundreds of 
meters between the actual force location and the C2 
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element’s estimate.  The absolute value represents the SA 
difference between the actual force location and the C2’s 
estimate.  The SA differences are added at the bottom of 
the table and the average value is also given.  The lower 
the number or difference the better.  An SA difference of 
zero would indicate that the C2 element new exactly where 
the blue force was.  The higher the number, the greater 
the error in estimation or the poorer the SA is.     
Note: all data in the tables below represent hundreds 
of meters plus or minus 100 meters.    
 
Mission # 1 (04NOV02), 














 E N  E N    
1 14 557  18 547 -4 10 14 
2 13 550  13 546 0 4 4 
3 9 547  8 544 1 3 4 
4 7 545  4 539 3 6 9 
5 5 544  7 543 -2 1 3 
6 4 544  5 540 -1 4 5 
7 2 542  3 548 -1 -6 7 
8 2 542  2 535 0 7 7 
9 998 539  1 533 3 6 9 
10 998 539  0 530 2 9 11 
11 996 538  990 537 6 1 7 
12 995 537  998 535 -3 2 5 
13 994 536  986 533 8 3 11 
14 992 535  987 532 5 3 8 
15 991 535  987 532 4 3 7 
16 990 535  987 532 3 3 6 
17 989 534  993 533 -4 1 5 
18 985 534  992 531 -7 3 10 
19 985 534  981 539 4 -5 9 






Average SA difference   7.1 
 









Mission # 1 (04NOV02), 

















 E N  E N    
1 990 549  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
2 990 549  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
3 991 548  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
4 992 548  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
5 992 547  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
6 991 546  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
7 989 546  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
8 988 546  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
9 988 546  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
10 988 545  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
11 987 545  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
12 985 543  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
13 984 543  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
14 984 545  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
15 986 546  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
16 988 548  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
17 998 549  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
18 992 551  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
19 992 553  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
26 987 552  986 528 1 24 25
Cumulative SA difference    25
Average SA difference    25
 










Mission # 1 (04NOV02), 
Alpha  




















 E N  E N   
1 986 534  987 532 -1 2  
2 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
3 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
4 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
5 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
6 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
7 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
8 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
9 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
10 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
11 986 533  987 532 -1 1 3
12 986 533  987 532 -1 1 2
13 986 533  987 532 -1 1 2
14 986 533  987 532 -1 1 2
15 986 534  987 532 -1 2 2
16 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
17 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
18 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
19 986 534  987 532 -1 2 3
34 986 534  986 532 0 2 3
Cumulative 
SA 
difference      
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Average SA difference      2.8
 
Table 3.   Pilot Alpha 04NOV02 
 
04NOV02 Mission #1, bravo forces. 
- Number of blue force detections of red forces:
  None.  
- Time to link up between pilot and blue force: 
  2h:30min 
-  Positive link up: Yes. 
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- Number of counter detections by red force of 
  blue force or pilot: None. 




















Figure 12.   Bravo Forces 04NOV02 
 
Mission # 1 (04NOV02), 















 E N  E N    
1 7 561  8 560 -1 1 2 
2 11 562  13 561 -2 1 3 
3 12 563  15 564 -3 -1 4 
4 15 567  16 566 -1 1 2 
5 16 568  18 570 -2 -2 4 
6 18 570  22 573 -4 -3 7 
7 20 572  24 574 -4 -2 6 
8 22 575  23 573 -1 2 3 
9 25 577  26 576 3 1 4 
10 27 579  28 579 2 0 2 
11 30 581  29 580 1 1 2 
12 30 581  31 582 -1 -1 2 
13 32 585  33 584 -1 1 2 
14 32 585  33 584 -1 1 2 
15 32 585  31 584 1 1 2 
16 32 585  33 584    
Cumulative 
SA 
difference       
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Average SA difference      3.1 
 











Mission # 1 
(04NOV02), 















 E N  E N    
1 15 591  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
2 17 592  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
3 17 592  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
4 20 594  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
5 21 594  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
6 19 594  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
7 19 593  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
8 18 592  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
9 18 592  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
10 18 592  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
11 19 591  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
12 20 590  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
13 21 588  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
14 21 586  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
15 22 586  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
16 24 586  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
Cumulative SA 
difference  Unknown    #VALUE! 
Average SA 
difference  Unknown    #VALUE! 
 






























 E N  E N    
1 33 584  32 585 1 -1 2 
2 32 583  32 585 0 -2 2 
3 32 582  32 585 0 -3 3 
4 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
5 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
6 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
7 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
8 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
9 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
10 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
11 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
12 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
13 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
14 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
15 33 583  32 585 1 -2 3 
16 32 582  33 584 -1 -2 3 
Cumulative SA difference      34 
Average SA difference      2.8 
 
Table 6.   Pilot Bravo 04NOV02 
 
05NOV02 Mission number two, alpha forces.  
- Number of blue force detections of red forces:
  None.  
- Time to link up between pilot and blue force: 
  2h:58min 
- Positive link up: Yes. 
- Number of counter detections by red force of 
  blue force or pilot: None. 
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de Blue force Alpha
Red force Alpha
Pilot Alpha
Figure 13.   Alpha Forces 05NOV02  
 
Mission # 2 (05NOV02), Alpha 














Difference   
 E N  E N    
1 7 561  8 560 -1 1 2 
2 7 561  6 565 1 -4 5 
3 7 566  7 570 0 -4 4 
4 7 570  11 573 -4 -3 7 
5 9 573  14 578 -5 -5 10 
6 11 577  12 575 -1 2 3 
7 13 577  19 576 -6 1 7 
8 13 577  23 579 -10 -2 12 
9 16 579  27 580 -11 -1 12 
10 20 580  31 583 -11 -3 14 
11 20 580  33 584 -13 -4 17 
12 20 580  24 579 -4 1 5 
13 23 581  27 580 -4 1 5 
14 26 582  31 583 -5 -1 6 
15 28 583  582 -4 1 5 
16 30 584  33 584 -3 0 3 
17 31 584  33 584 -2 0 2 
18 32 585  33 584 -1 1 2 
Cumulative SA difference    121 
Average SA difference     6.7 
32 
 








Mission # 2 (05NOV02), Alpha 















 E N  E N    
1 14 591  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
2 16 596  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
3 19 595  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
4 19 596  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
5 19 596  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
6 20 598  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
7 20 598  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
8 22 598  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
9 22 598  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
10 22 597  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
11 23 596  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
12 24 596  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
13 25 594  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
14 24 592  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
15 24 592  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
16 25 591  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
17 25 589  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
18 24 587  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
Cumulative SA difference  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! 
Average SA 
difference   Unknown Unknown #VALUE! 
 















 Mission # 2 (05NOV02), 
















 E N  E N    
1 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
2 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
3 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
4 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
5 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
6 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
7 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
8 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
9 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
10 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
11 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
12 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
13 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
14 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
15 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
16 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
17 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
18 32 586  33 584 -1 2 3 
Cumulative SA difference    54 
Average SA difference     3 
Table 9.   Pilot Alpha 05NOV02 
 
05NOV02 Mission number two, bravo forces.  
- Number of blue force detections of red forces:
  None.  
- Time to link up between pilot and blue force: 
  2h:40min 
- Positive link up: Yes. 
- Number of counter detections by red force of 
  blue force or pilot: None. 
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e blue force bravo
red force bravo
pilot bravo
Figure 14.   Bravo Forces 05NOV02  
 
 
Mission # 2 (05NOV02), 















 E N  E N    
1 968 610  978 610 -10 0 10 
2 967 602  974 607 -7 -5 12 
3 964 598  971 607 -7 -9 16 
4 961 597  969 604 -8 -7 15 
5 957 599  966 601 -9 -2 11 
6 953 599  962 600 -9 -1 10 
7 951 602  952 600 -1 2 3 
8 949 604  948 601 1 3 4 
9 948 603  946 603 2 0 2 
10 948 602  946 603 2 -1 3 
11 943 605  946 603 -3 2 5 
12 945 605  945 603 0 2 2 
13 944 604  945 603 -1 1 2 
14 939 602  945 603 -6 -1 7 
15 938 602  945 603 -7 -1 8 
16 946 604  945 603 1 1 2 
17 945 603  945 603 0 0 0 
Cumulative SA difference    112 
Average SA difference     6.6 
 












Mission # 2 (05NOV02), Bravo 















 E N  E N    
1 962 595  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
2 960 595  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
3 957 599  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
4 952 599  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
5 953 600  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
6 950 603  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
7 952 604  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
8 953 604  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
9 954 604  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
10 953 603  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
11 952 601  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
12 952 600  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
13 951 601  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
14 952 601  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
15 953 601  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
16 954 601  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
17 955 601  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
Cumulative SA difference  Unknown Unknown #VALUE! 
Average SA 
difference   Unknown Unknown #VALUE! 
 












Mission # 2 (05NOV02), 
















 E N  E N    
1 945 604  945 604 0 0 0 
2 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
3 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
4 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
5 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
6 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
7 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
8 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
9 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
10 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
11 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
12 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
13 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
14 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
15 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
16 946 604  945 604 1 0 1 
17 946 604  945 602 1 2 3 
Cumulative SA 
difference     18 
Average SA 
difference      1.1 
 
Table 12.   Pilot Bravo 05NOV02 
 
2. Qualitative Data 
Blue force: 
All blue forces utilized the last known point of 
pilot’s position and UHF line of sight radio 
communications with pilot to approximate pilot’s position. 
Blue forces were confident in the general position of 
pilot but had little confidence in exact position.  
Communications were necessary to verify position and there 
was still some lack of confidence especially in the more 
challenging terrain. 
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In establishing target identification, one blue force 
felt very confident on one mission that the pilot was 
authentic by establishing authenticity via radio 
communication with bona fides.  However, blue forces did 
not feel confident on all remaining missions until pilot 
was very near or in custody and could answer more specific 
questions to authenticate.  In one instance the blue force 
almost walked directly into pilot’s position. 
Blue forces felt confident in information passed to 
them by the C2 element. 
Downed pilot: 
Downed pilots never knew their positions in relation 
to any other forces.  In one mission, a downed pilot 
confused the blue search element by relaying slightly 
incorrect information about his position.  This created 
almost an hour delay in the pilot’s recovery.  In another 
mission, the red force walked within 25 meters of the 
pilot’s position while the pilot lay motionless in a hide 
sight.  The pilot was undetected by the red force.  
Downed pilots had moderate confidence in their exact 
location (5 out of a 10 point scale). 
Downed pilots were strongly confident in information 
passed to them from the blue force (10 out of 10). 
Command and Control element: 
The C2 element had moderate confidence (5 out of 10) 
in the relative positions of the blue force and the downed 
pilot.  Last known positions, radio communications, 
briefed standard operating procedures, and estimated 
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movement direction and speed were used to attempt to 
accurately track forces. 
The C2 element never knew the positions of any red 
force. 
The C2 element was very confident (10 out of 10) in 
the information passed to them by the blue force.  
However, some of this information was discovered to be 
slightly inaccurate, but the C2 element had no way to 
verify the information. 
Red force: 
The red force never detected blue forces or downed 
pilots in any of the missions.  Note for analysis; this 
would make it difficult to “improve” using UAVs except for 
confidence level in their own position.  In future LOEs 
there should be more red team success without UAVs. 
B. DATA WITH UAV 
1. Quantitative Data  
Due to the fact that the UAVs were unable to fly the 
profiles originally anticipated, the quantitative data 
that could have been directly compared to the data without 
UAVs was unobtainable.  Instead, data collected from 
separate flights, without ground forces, and with IR 
strobes representing fixed force locations had to be 
interpreted.  These outside-scenario flights were treated 
as a snap shot of the events that occurred during the 
original scenario that had moving troops on the ground.  
This allowed the data taken with the UAV to be compared to 
a single set of data taken from the experiment with ground 
forces but without UAVs.  For this reason, the data 
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presented below is not in the same exact format as the 
data collected for the scenarios without the UAVs.  
At the Arizona test site, a two by four kilometer box 
was used as the op area, and infrared strobes were placed 
in the box in three locations to represent the downed 
pilot, blue force, and red force, respectively.  Four 
sorties of UAV flights that lasted just under one hour 
each were flown over the op area to locate the three 
separate forces (IR strobes).  The C2 element (one Army SF 
MAJ) observed the video screen in the tactical operation 
center (TOC) next to the UAV pilot.  When the C2 element 
observed a strobe, the UAV pilot was informed, and the UAV 
pilot provided a verbal location of the UAV in latitude 
and longitude (later converted to Universal Transverse 
Mercador (UTM) grid coordinates).  This location was then 
plotted by the C2 element.  Only one data point could be 
collected for each force (IR strobe).  The true GPS 
locations in UTM +100m are given in Table 13 in a similar 
format to the many data points per moving force given in 
multiple tables for the non-UAV missions.  The average 
situational awareness (SA) difference is a comparable 
figure to the average SA difference in all other SA 
tables.  The lower the SA difference the better.  Notice 
should be taken of the fact that the red force was never 
located in the scenarios without the UAV and that the red 
force position was plotted without any SA error at all 
+100m.   
Table 13 provides SA difference for a single point 
only, but for all forces within the op area.  The first 
row is the name of the force (IR strobe).  The next two 
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rows are the actual locations of the strobes reduced to 6 
digit UTM grid coordinates used most often by ground 
forces.  This means the actual grid coordinate for the 
Blue Alpha force was 056537.  The actual grid coordinate 
for the Pilot Alpha was 030536 located beneath the Blue 
Alpha coordinates in the second and third row.  The grids 
were separated into two columns to allow for accurate 
comparisons of error when the C2 element estimated the 
force locations.  The next two rows containing data are 
the C2 estimates of the force locations which is the same 
as the UAV pilot’s report of the UAV location when the C2 
element observed a strobe.  The next two rows are the 
difference between the actual location of the forces (or 
strobes) and the C2’s estimate of those locations.  
Because negative numbers can be a valid result, the 
absolute values are then accumulated in the final row.  
The absolute value is the true difference in locations of 
the forces because the coordinates represent locations and 
the absolute value represents differences in those 
locations in any direction.  The absolute values, now 
identified as the difference in situational awareness 
(SA), are added together at the bottom of the table, and 
the average is also given.  If the SA difference were to 
be zero, this would mean there was no difference between 
the actual location of the forces (strobes) and the C2’s 
estimate of that location.  This is the most desired SA 
difference.  If the number is unknown, this would be the 
worst SA difference because the C2 element would have no 
idea of a forces actual location.    
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 Mission (05DEC02)  
Alpha         
Force GPS track   C2 estimate Difference E Difference N 
Absolute  
value   
 actual location  
2 estimates 
then average  
Situational  
Awareness 
 E N  E N   difference  
estimate one    56 538     
estimate two    54 538     
BLUE ALPHA 56 537  55 538 1 -1 2  
          
Pilot A 30 536  29 536 1 0 1  
      0 0   
estimate one    36 542     
estimate two    34 540     
Red A 35 541  35 541 0 0 0  
          
Cumulative SA difference      3 
 
Average SA difference       1 
 
 
Table 13.   Blue Force, Red Force, Pilot Location 
Data, 05DEC02   
Sortie data: 
Max altitude: 2614 feet AGL (most flights 
were conducted at this 
altitude. 
Durations: Flights ranged from 36 to 66 
minutes in duration.  66 
minute duration approached 
maximum duration and is 
limited by fuel and battery 
life.  
Fuel consumption: Average of 35 oz/hour 
Max range from launch: Approximately 8km 
2. Qualitative Data 
Two flights were flown at Camp Roberts on 06NOV02 
with troops on the ground conducting limited downed pilot 
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scenarios in a small 1km square area.  The UAV was flown 
under manual control at approximately 400ft and 30knts, 
which provided a picture that moved too fast across the 
ground to determine force location relationships at night.  
Due to liability issues, the UAV was flown by remote 
control within visual range of a pilot on the ground 
instead of autonomously from a ground control station.  
This low altitude had to be maintained to allow the pilot 
to maintain visual contact with the UAV.   
This limited scenario was conducted at night to test 
the ability of the UAV camera to see IR strobes during 
flight as well as test the video receivers and screens the 
search element carried in the field.  Forces in the field 
found it impractical to view a video screen at night, near 
a target area (1km or closer).  The video screens were 
very bright and ruined the night vision of the member of 
the search element that viewed it.  The light emanating 
from the video screen was also difficult to mask.  The 
search element covered the screens in red tinted plastic 
bags in an attempt at managing light discipline but were 
unsuccessful at solving the problem adequately during this 
time period.  The 4”x6”x2”video screen was carried inside 
the shirt after carrying it in cargo pockets proved to be 
too cumbersome.  The antenna, battery, and receiver fit 
well in a small Alice pack with plenty of room to spare.  
In this limited scenario, blue forces did not want direct 
control over the UAV if good communications could be 
maintained with C2 and directions could be rapidly given 
to the UAV pilot. 
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Having resolved liability issues, four sorties were 
flown on 05DEC02 in Tucson, AZ at Leroy Airport.  The UAVs 
were able to fly autonomously at altitudes of about 
2000ft.  This allowed the C2 element much more time to 
view the IR strobes as they moved more slowly across the 
screen.  However, the differences in each force’s strobes, 
brightness, and periodicity were harder to detect at this 
altitude and at greater distances from one another, which 
made it harder to determine which force was which.  A 
second op area was set up farther away from the UAV launch 
point but could not be used due to the limited range of 
the analog video which had a max range of about eight km 
and a working range of about three to four km.  The 
autonomous flight control system worked perfectly during 
all four sorties and flew preprogrammed flights paths 
without error.   
Flight paths developed for the original scenarios 
were not utilized due to the fact that the forces 
(strobes) would not be moving.  A simple flight pattern 
consisting of back and forth, slightly overlapping paths 
was utilized to find all stationary forces (strobes).       
A fifth sortie was flown on 06DEC02 to test an engine 
with better fuel economy.  This UAV flew for one hour and 
twenty-five minutes and landed with some fuel still 
onboard. 
It is also important to note that NSW forces were 
never required to operate the vehicles but merely receive 
their sensor data.  This does not mean that contractors 
need to accompany the vehicles during possible future 
employment.  On the contrary, the goal of the developers, 
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and the feedback of desired capabilities from NSW 
participants, is to design a vehicle that can be launched 
with minimal training.  This merit would appear to 
prohibit the use of larger UAVs such as the Hunter.  “A 
report by TRW on experiences in the Balkans notes that 
contractors provided 70 percent of the maintenance on the 
Hunter UAVS” (Robinson, 2002, p. 2).  This maintenance 
requirement would seem to be an unacceptable situation for 
a force that is often required to deploy rapidly with a 
minimal logistics tail.        
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VI. DATA ANALYSIS  
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
While all specific MOEs could not be evaluated due to 
the limitations placed on the experiment, enough data was 
gathered to demonstrate or infer a positive impact from 
the use of UAVs. A direct improvement to situational 
awareness for the C2 element can be seen in the empirical 
data below.  Positive target identification will require 
more sophisticated equipment, but even the simple IR 
strobes used in this LOE could help improve target 
identification if used creatively.  Force protection could 
be greatly enhanced if the low-light camera were replaced 
with a thermal imaging camera.  The unique IR strobe 
placed on the red force during the LOE represented this 
capability and greatly enhanced force protection simply by 
knowing the location of any enemy personnel within the op 
area.     
The “cumulative SA difference” seen above in tables 1 
through 13 represents the total amount of error in 
hundreds of meters that the C2 element accumulated as they 
attempted to track the blue forces, the pilot, and the red 
forces.  The number figure should not be viewed as 
important on its own but should be viewed as important 
when the average is used as a tool for comparison.  The SA 
difference is like a golf score, the lower the better.  
The greater the SA difference the more error was involved 
in the C2 elements tracking of the forces.  This figure 
can be compared for missions conducted in the same op 
areas with the same amount of distances involved.   
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The “Average SA difference” can be used to compare 
different op areas or different missions that perhaps have 
more datum points.  Noted earlier the worst of all SA 
differences is the complete unknown location.  This means 
the C2 element could not even estimate the red force 
location because they had absolutely no information to 
make any type of estimation.  This is obviously the least 
amount of situational awareness or the greatest amount of 
SA difference between a forces actual location and the 
location that the C2 elements estimate they are in. 
In Tables 1 through 13, the C2 element can be seen as 
being more accurate when tracking the pilot’s location.  
This is due to the fact that the pilots only moved a short 
distance from their last known point.  Had the operations 
taken longer, over four hours, and the pilots began to 
move, the SA difference would surely increase. 
The average SA difference for the flights conducted 
with the UAV was much lower than the average SA for all 
other forces without the UAV.  This is the most 
significant finding as it is the most directly comparable 
data.  The figures below are derived from tables 1-13 and 
show the minimal average error in SA for the C2 element 
with the UAV as compared to the somewhat larger average 
error in SA for the C2 element without the UAV. 
Non-UAV data: 
- Non-UAV Blue Alpha SA 04NOV  7.1 
- Non-UAV Red Alpha SA 04NOV     25.0 
- Non-UAV Pilot Alpha SA 04NOV  2.8 
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- Non-UAV Blue Bravo SA 04NOV  3.1 
- Non-UAV Red Bravo SA 04NOV  Unknown! 
- Non-UAV Pilot Bravo SA 04NOV  2.8 
 
- Non-UAV Blue Alpha SA 05NOV  6.7 
- Non-UAV Red Alpha SA 05NOV  Unknown! 
- Non-UAV Pilot Alpha SA 05NOV  3.0 
 
- Non-UAV Blue Bravo SA 05NOV  6.6 
- Non-UAV Red Bravo SA 05NOV  Unknown! 
- Non-UAV Pilot Bravo SA 05NOV  1.1 
 
UAV Data: 
- UAV Blue Alpha SA 05DEC:   2.0 
- UAV Red Alpha SA 05DEC:   1.0 
- UAV Pilot Alpha SA 05DEC   0.0 
 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  76
VII. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. DESCRIPTION OF MODELS 
The multiple departments at NPS that participated in 
this thesis provided excellent models which helped design 
the LOE to maximize the amount of usable data to be 
retrieved.  Models were used to develop two specific 
objectives; identification of the most efficient flight 
patterns and identification of the variables and the 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  An adapted form of the 
derived optimum flight patterns were programmed into the 
UAV avionics/control system to provide autonomous 
operations. 
1. Models for Optimum Flight Patterns 
The flight patterns were developed by MAJ Poh and MAJ 
Tan of the Singapore Air Force, both international 
students at NPS, as an end-of-the-quarter project for 
their Systems Engineering and Integration course, in 
response to my request.  The information provided below 
that details how the patterns were developed is taken 
directly from their project and is fully attributable to 
them. 
The Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) utilized for 
both the downed pilot flight pattern and patrol flight 
pattern were based on the requirement of having a one 
kilometer diameter of situational awareness.  This one 
kilometer diameter is an estimate of the distance required 
for a SEAL patrol to react to the ability of an enemy 
force to detect a moving SEAL patrol (or pilot) without 
sensors in a variety of terrain (and have enough warning 
  77
to evade detection).  MAJ Poh and MAJ Tan concluded that 
for the patrol flight pattern, they needed to maximize 
coverage area, minimize length of search pattern, and 
maximize the distance of look-ahead buffer as the patrol 
would most often be moving forward.  These requirements 
conflicted with one another, and therefore an optimization 
scheme had to be developed.  The optimal pattern developed 
can be seen in Figure 5, but this pattern only resulted in 
a coverage factor of .40.  In other words, the maximum 
amount of area that could be covered, given the 
characteristics of the UAV (speed of 35knts, turning  
radius of 250m, and sensor field of view of 90m at 400ft 
altitude), the movement of the force, and the desired 
coverage area, was only 40 percent. 
In order to increase the coverage factor the 
developers suggested to either fly two UAVs in the above 
pattern, which could double the coverage factor, or 
increase the altitude to 800ft, which would accomplish the 
same thing.  Flying two UAVs was not practical due to a 
limited number of aircraft available at the present time 
and the difficulties that would arise in flying two 
unmanned aircraft in close proximity.  After some field 
experimentation, it was discovered that the aircraft could 
fly at 800ft or higher and still acquire the infrared 
strobes utilized by both enemy and friendly forces.  This 
meant that, theoretically, 100 percent of the desired area 
could be covered or a coverage factor of 1.0 could be 
achieved.  As it turned out an altitude of 2000ft was 
used.  This provided approximately a 500m field of view on 
the ground.  This would provide 100 percent coverage in an 
area greater than that of the initially derived 1km 
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diameter.  It also meant that a simpler flight pattern 
could be utilized. 
The downed pilot search flight pattern developed was 
a simple design used to search about the last known point 
of the downed pilot’s location.  This pattern incorporated 
the assumption that the downed pilot would be no further 
than 400 meters from the last known position given, which 
is how the LOE scenario was designed.  This pattern can be 
seen in Figure 3. 
The third pattern developed was designed to be flown 
by the downed pilot search UAV after the pilot was 
located.  The same one kilometer diameter area of coverage 
required by the search element was then desired for the 
downed pilot.  This would prevent enemy forces from 
approaching the downed pilot undetected, as well aid the 
search team in locating the pilot as rapidly as possible 
while continuing to avoid the enemy.  This flight pattern 
is presented in figure 4. 
2. Mathematical Model for Experiment Variables and 
MOEs 
Another model was developed by a research team that 
consisted of the author and two other Models of Conflict 
(SO4410) classmates; U.S. Army MAJ Mike Aitken and U.S. 
Air Force MAJ Phil Barton.  This model was developed 
primarily to identify the experiment variables and MOEs.  
The model also helped determine the feasibility of the LOE 
by analyzing the force distributions within the search 
area and the probability of the forces detecting each 
other, which can be seen in figure 16 at the end of this 
section.  The model was based on traditional mathematical 
modeling procedures (Giordano, Weir, and Fox, 1997, p.39). 
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The problem: 
Produce a mathematical model that can represent 
the effect/value of a tactical UAV on a NSW CSAR 
mission. 
Dependent variables: 
 - Amount of time to reach downed pilot  
 - Probability of finding/detecting the  
   pilot  
 - Probability of detecting the red force 
 - Probability of the search element   
   being detected 
 - Situational awareness 
 Independent variables: 
 - Terrain 
 - Force Size, training, quality 
 - Information 
 - Distance 
 - Signature 
 - Speed (basically constant rate of   
   movement for small troops) 
 - UAV asset 
 Interrelationships among variables: 
 Speed is relatively the same for both groups 
(3km per hour) and will not change drastically near the 
objective area, therefore distance or area to be covered 
determines time (t=d/v = d/const).   
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 Distance is a function of the area to be 
searched.  The required search area, in turn, is inversely 
proportional to the amount of information or intelligence 
available.  The blue search element should have more 
information about the downed pilot’s location than the red 
force, therefore the area they are required to cover 
should be smaller and the time needed shorter.  
 Terrain will be the same for all involved and 
should not impact one group more than the other except in 
the most extreme conditions (pilot trying to hide in open 
flat desert); therefore it can be neglected except to 
determine the area to be searched. 
 Force, number of troops, training, morale, etc. 
were neglected as variables in this simplified analysis. 
 Signature affects detection probability. 
 Situational awareness is a function of C2 and 
sensors.  In this model, “sensors” referred to the UAV.  
C2 effectiveness usually depends on the ability of the 
command element to know the information and pass it along 
to the search element.  In this model C2 was considered 
perfect, in other words the command element knows all the 
sensor knows and relays this without difficulty to the 
search element so the search element has the same 
information and situational awareness.  Therefore, 
situational awareness was only a function of the UAV asset 
and the force employing it. 
 Probability of detection of all forces is the 
key dependent variable to be modeled and in its simplest 
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GIVEN CAPABILITIES   




km²/hr   
UAV 60 90 5.4 
Red 3 10 0.03 
Blue 3 10 0.03 
    
 
Table 14.   Search Capabilities 
 
 - Patrol area coverage rate: (3km/hr)(.01km) 
   = .03km²/hr 
 -  UAV area coverage rate: (60km/hr)(.09km)  
  = 5.4 km²/hr 
 - Red force coverage rate: (3km/hr)(.01km) 
  = .03km²/hr 
 
  82
 to arrive at circle 
UAV and Blue Force
3.39km
Area of rectangle Red force must search is 
LxW=8km². 
Area of circle Blue force and UAV must 
search is, r=400m, (ΠR²=.503 km²) + 





Figure 15.   Search Area Calculations 
   
- Select the search area based upon the 
amount of information or intelligence 
available, which is different for the Red 
and Blue forces (Figure 15). 
- Determine the amount of time searches 
should take for each force 
 
TIME REQUIRED TO SEARCH GIVEN AREA   
 AREA km² 
TRAVEL TIME  
             hrs.min
SEARCH SPEED  
       km²/hr 
TIME   
  hrs.min 
UAV 0.503 6 min 5.4 9 min 
Red 8 0 0.03 277 hr 
Blue 0.503 1 hr 0.03 17 hrs 
 
Table 15.   Time to Search Given Areas 
 
Table 15 demonstrates how the estimated search 
times were derived.  The UAV row, for example, divides the 
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area required to search (the circle), .503 km² by the 
search speed capability of 5.4km²/hr, which equals .093hrs 
or approximately 6min. The travel time to the circle is 
also added, (3.39/60=.0565 or 3.4min), for a total of 
(6+3.4)= 9.4min.  
 Probability of detection is a function of the 
amount of the time used and the situational awareness of 
the forces during that time.  This should be able to be 
seen (Figure 16) as a Normal distribution with the 
probability of detecting the pilot on the y-axis and area 




Blue Force with 
UAV  _____ 
 
Blue force without 
UAV  _____   
 





Figure 16.   Search Area Distributions for Forces 




Note: Blue Force with a UAV has the same SA as the 
UAV since perfect communication has been assumed.  Also, 
an observation was made during the identification of the 
variables that unless there is going to be a force-on-
force confrontation then the effect of the size of the 
force is marginalized.  In fact, to accomplish missions in 
which no enemy is to be contacted by design then the 
smallest force possible to complete the mission is the 
force of choice in relationship to probability of 
detection for all parties. 
The amount of time each force will take to search is 
directly proportional to the area each force is required 
to search.  The time can be substituted for the area on 
the x-axis and plotted versus the probability of detection 
on the y-axis yielding a cumulative probability of 
detection, which can be seen in Figure 17. 
 
 
Blue Force with  
UAV  _____ 
 
Blue force without 
UAV  _____   
 





Figure 17.   Cumulative Probability of Detection  
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 The following distribution graph is another 
representation of the areas each force must search to find 
the pilot.  This is done by displaying the pilot’s 
possible location, from the perspective of the searching 
forces, given the intelligence provided each force and the 
op area distances.  This model presents two main ideas:  
the first is that the red force is too disadvantaged to 
make this a reasonable experiment if a representation of 
the effect of the UAV is desired.  The second is the 
addition of the UAV asset should reduce the time it takes 
the blue force to locate the pilot due to the reduced area 

































 Run simulations 
Implementation: 
 Conduct LOE 
 Analyze results, adjust experiment, and repeat 
or provide results to future researchers. 
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES) 
The following measures of effectiveness were derived 
from and then validated by the mathematical model above. 
Situational awareness 
Command and Control 
Target identification 
Force protection 
Cumulative distance between blue forces and pilot 
Cumulative distance between red forces and all blue 
forces 
Number of red force detections of blue forces 
Time to link up between pilot and blue force 
Number of mission success (link up without 
compromise) 
Command and Control (C2) red force location 
estimation  
C2 blue force location estimation 
C2 downed pilot location estimation 
Maintenance:  
Number of blue force detections of red forces  
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Qualitative responses to usability of UAV equipment 
in the field 
C. DESCRIPTION OF SIMULATION 
The models above also yielded the information needed 
to input into a simulation.  Table 15, which displays the 
time each force needs to search, and Figure 18, which 
displays the randomly distributed possible force locations 
led the author to believe that the red force would most 
likely not encounter the blue force without providing the 
red force additional intelligence.  This information was 
then entered into the simulation to verify results.  The 
simulator utilized was the Multi-Agent Robotic Swarm 
Simulation (MARSS) developed by another international 
student at NPS, CPT Alistair Dickie (Australian Army).  
This simulation is an agent-based simulation developed to 
model the possible swarming characteristics of UAVs, and 
can be located on the World Wide Web at 
http://diana.gl.nps.navy.mil/~ajdickie/marss/.  The 
following report was generated by CPT Dickie: 
LT JOSH BUTNER LOE IMPLEMENTATION IN MARSS 
Captain Alistair Dickie – Australian Army 
During the period 16  to 20  September 2002, a 
limited objective live experiment to be conducted by LT 
Josh Butner later this year was investigated using MARSS.  
The live experiment consists of a Special Forces blue team 
searching for a blue downed pilot in an area with a 
hostile red team.  The will be conducted with and without 
blue UAV support to determine the effectiveness of 
tactical UAVs in supporting Special Forces missions.  
th th
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The aims of this analysis were to visualize the 
proposed experiment and gain some insight regarding the 
conduct of the experiment. 
This scenario was partially implemented in MARSS. 
Initially a base scenario was implemented that 
consisted of a blue entity representing the downed pilot, 
a single red entity searching for the pilot, and a single 
blue entity representing the special forces search team. 
Starting positions, search areas, sensor assumptions, and 
behaviors were implemented to as closely as possible 
replicate the proposed live experiment.  The 
implementation of the extended scenario with blue UAV 
support was started, however not fully completed. 
The measure of effectiveness of blue performance was 
simply the proportion of runs where they managed to locate 
and move to the downed pilot, prior to red detection of 
either the downed pilot or the blue Special Forces team.  
Qualitative results indicated that with the proposed 
experimental parameters the blue team would win almost all 
the time.  From an experimental viewpoint this is somewhat 
concerning as it becomes difficult to show the effect of 
increased performance when the UAVs become involved. 
Further discussion revealed that in reality Special 
Forces would rarely conduct similar missions if there were 
a high risk of contacting a red force.  As the live 
experiment was being designed to reflect reality it was 
not surprising that the simulation suggested an 
overwhelming blue success.  
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This led to a slight change of philosophy regarding 
the aims of the overall experiment.  By evening the odds 
in the base scenario, it is expected that the effect of 
the inclusion of UAVs could be shown much more 
effectively.  This may show that tactical UAVs can do more 
than just support current missions; they may enable 
Special Forces to conduct missions that previously had 
been considered too risky. 
While the live experiment was far from investigated 
fully using simulation, the analysis did provide limited 
insight [and needed changes in the experiment plan]. 
Further analysis could provide quantitative results on 
both the base and extended scenarios. 
Figure 19 below contains a screen capture of the 3D 
view from MARSS.  Shown is the VRML representation of the 
SWARM UAV that was used in the preparation of the extended 
scenarios.  These scenarios were not completed.  
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 Figure 19.   MARRS Screen Capture One  
 
The screen capture in figure 20 is the overall MARSS 
display.  This shows the base scenario (no UAV support) 
running.  The blue pilot is represented in the 3D display 
by a simple chess piece.  Note the background used is an 
image of the map of the actual exercise area.  
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 Figure 20.   MARRS screen capture Two  
 
End CPT Alistair Report. 
CPT Alistair’s MARSS simulation confirmed what had 
been identified in the mathematical model.  The red forces 
needed to be given more intelligence to decrease the area 
they were required to cover.  This was accomplished by 
reducing the red force search area from the entire two by 
four km op area to the two square kilometers in which the 




The organizational network and the development of the 
limited objective experiment that tested emerging UAV 
technologies in an operational and analytical environment 
proved to be a workable concept that yielded rich results.  
The network consisted of national laboratories, business, 
interdisciplinary NPS working groups, students, 
operational forces, and operational commands (see 
participants).  The loose network remains viable and 
stands ready to be tapped by future students.  
Analysis of the actual integration of a tactical UAV 
with NSW forces during a NSW downed pilot recovery mission 
proved to yield useful data.  This data inferred that a 
small, inexpensive, expendable, tactical UAV could impact 
NSW combat effectiveness in a positive way.  The system 
tested may not be deployable today, but the idea proved 
sound and the parts that make up the whole of the system 
had a positive impact. 
Finally, and most importantly, the research 
demonstrated that the use of an inexpensive, small UAV 
carrying, in this case, an IR camera and simulated 
communications relay capability, launched by rear echelon 
personnel, flown by onboard autonomous avionics to 
prescribed and changeable waypoints, emitting live video 
feeds to both the SEAL platoon in the field as well as the 
C2 element in the rear, proved to have a definite positive 
impact on the combat effectiveness of NSW forces. 
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While the experiment did not come to full fruition, 
much data was collected, and analysis of that data led to 
the following conclusions: 
NSW forces don’t need, nor do they desire, to be 
burdened with the requirement of launching or flying the 
UAV.  The concept of the TOC located at the Forward 
Operating Base (FOB), launching the UAV for the inserted 
NSW patrol, has been proven to be valid concept within an 
8km range.  This range will surely increase as video and 
communications improve. 
Viewing a video feed in the field, during a foot 
patrol, near a target area may not be as advantageous as 
having a C2 element dedicated to viewing that feed, relay 
the information over a communications net capable of 
maintaining constant communications.  (Note: the C2 
element in the LOE was solely dedicated to observing and 
communicating with the single NSW element in the field). 
The ability to track blue forces on the ground with a 
small tactical UAV has been demonstrated.  The IR strobes 
utilized for the LOE purposes were not clandestine enough 
for operational use during special operations, but this 
limitation can be overcome. 
NSW forces can quickly adapt to the use of these new 
technologies given these technologies don’t degrade 
current capabilities to provide new capabilities in 
different areas.  
Developers of UAVs and their supporting technologies 
can benefit from feedback from operators in the field 
conducting LOEs. 
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The loose network developed enhanced both the design 
of the LOE as well as the dissemination of information.  
The dissemination of information included the results of 
this LOE being sent out and related information coming 
back in before the results were entirely collated. 
B. FUTURE 
The loose network developed remains active and a 
follow-on student has already shown interest in continuing 
some of this research as well as broadening the scope of 
the research.  If anything, the network will grow as 
participants understand more fully the concepts and 
process of the LOE.  The link to operational commands will 
continue to be the most difficult aspect of the network to 
maintain as their primary concern is correctly placed on 
mission accomplishment not research.  However, some 
students may be able to gain “sponsorship” by operational 
commands if the research subject addresses that commands 
current needs.     
The technology supporting small tactical UAVs is 
still developing.  Optimal duration, speed, and payload 
capabilities do not currently exist in one aircraft.  
However, these capabilities are being rapidly developed 
and if money and interest were focused in a specific 
direction, perhaps designated as an NSW requirement, then 
this capability could be developed that much more rapidly.  
Some examples of developing technologies that are 
directly related to the SWARM UAV are: 
- An IBM Computer that interrogates a beacon 
through the camera onboard the UAV to positively 
ID personnel. 
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- New modems with a range of about 20 miles and a 
bandwidth of at least 1Mb/s.  This will allow 
for extended range of autonomous flight as well 
as digital video transmission. 
- Onboard computer filtration of images to 
determine if video is of interest and only 
transmitting that video in order to free up 
bandwidth for other aircraft. 
All of these advancements in technology can increase 
the capability of these small tactical UAVs.  Minimum 
operational requirements articulated by the users (NSW 
forces) based on data collected during this LOE and future 
LOEs could help focus these efforts and prioritize them.  
  
 
- Generators for current SWARM engines that will 
erase the dependency on batteries.   
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